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Moving Beyond Materialism: Can Transpersonal Psychology 
Contribute to Cultural Transformation? 
The issue of whether it is possible to separate science and metaphysics is discussed, with 
reference to William James and the writings of quantum physicists. The metaphysical 
framework of scientific materialism is analysed and some of its key assumptions are identified. 
It is suggested that these assumptions are becoming increasingly untenable, as is evident by 
the advocacy of post-materialist science by some contemporary scientists. The main appeal 
of transpersonal psychology to students and practitioners is arguably its lack of allegiance to a 
materialist metaphysics. Rather than allying itself to the metaphysical paradigm of naturalistic 
science or attempting to bracket out metaphysics, transpersonal psychology should operate 
openly within the framework of post-materialistic science. Rather than distancing itself from 
areas such as near-death studies and parapsychology, it should embrace and cooperate with 
them, sharing the same post-materialist perspective. Transpersonal psychology should not 
attempt to reduce itself to fit into mainstream psychology but to try expand mainstream 
psychology to include its concerns and principles. In a laudable attempt to pursue a more 
scientific approach, some transpersonal theorists have arguably swung too extremely away 
from essentialism/perennialism and metaphysics. It is hoped that a more balanced approach 
may be found, incorporating more nuanced and phenomenological forms of perennialism, 
and  more cautious metaphysical claims.
International Journ l of Transpersonal Studies, 36(2), 2017, pp. 147-159 




In concluding this dialogue, I would like to extend its range. In addition to addressing some of the specific points Hartelius has made, I would like to look at 
some of the wider implications of the issues that have 
been discussed. I will look at the issue of metaphysics 
from a cultural perspective, and also address questions 
about the role of transpersonal psychology, and its future. 
I will also discuss questions regarding the scientific 
status of transpersonal psychology, and its relationship 
to mainstream psychology.
 Hartelius (2017c) has made some helpful 
comments about how the field of transpersonal 
psychology can influence mainstream psychology. I 
will follow his lead with some suggestions of my own, 
extending the debate beyond the field of psychology to 
discuss the possible cultural influences of transpersonal 
psychology. I will argue that the materialist metaphysical 
model that has dominated secular culture since the 
end of the nineteenth century has had profoundly 
detrimental psychological, cultural, and environmental 
consequences. There is an argument that, in order 
to flourish, Western culture has to adopt alternative 
metaphysical perspectives. A significant development in 
this regard is the “post-materialist science” movement 
which challenges the fundamental assumptions of 
materialism. In my experience (which may not be 
representative, of course), the primary appeal of 
transpersonal psychology for students and practitioners 
is that it points toward “post-materialist” metaphysical 
perspectives. Whereas mainstream psychology tends to 
ally itself to materialism, transpersonal psychology has 
traditionally suggested alternative views of reality. Rather 
than attempting to appear metaphysically neutral or to 
bracket out metaphysics—or even adopting the principles 
of scientific naturalism (Ferrer, 2014)—transpersonal 
psychology should actively reject materialism and openly 
adopt post-materialist perspectives, allowing them to 
inform its approach. In doing so, the field could make a 
real contribution to the process of cultural change.
 My argument is admittedly speculative and 
provocative, and I am partly making it in the hope that it 
will stimulate further discussion.
https://doi.org/10.24972/ijts.2017.36.2.147
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The Metaphysics of Science
A central theme of Hartelius’s (2017c) arguments throughout this dialogue has been his view that 
metaphysics is an unwelcome intruder into science, 
and that it is best to attempt to separate the two areas. 
Hartelius has argued that “the incorporation of religious 
and metaphysical claims is not the province of any 
psychology, transpersonal or otherwise” (p. 137). In his 
latest response, he has suggested that those—including 
me—who make such claims should be seen as spiritual 
teachers and “warmly appreciated and encouraged to 
continue their important work outside of the context of 
psychology” (p. 137). 
 William James originally held a similar 
view. When he began The Principles of Psychology, 
James believed that psychology should be purely a 
natural science. He argued that psychologists should 
investigate the correlations between the mind and the 
brain without pondering over their implications, which 
would be trespassing into metaphysics. He advocated 
a “descriptive psychology” that examined correlations 
without investigating how they arose or what they 
implied (Lambeth, 1999). 
 Soon afterwards, however, James revised his 
views. He came to believe (and continued to believe for 
the rest of his life) that it was futile and intellectually 
dishonest to artificially separate natural science and 
metaphysics (Lambeth, 1999; Kelly, 2007). According 
to James a naturalistic “descriptive” psychology was 
ungrounded and unstable, not “a sort of psychology that 
stands at last on solid ground” but “just the reverse … 
a psychology particularly fragile, into which the waters 
of metaphysical criticism leak at every joint” (James, 
1892, pp. 467–468). As James stated in his presidential 
address to the American Psychological Society in 1894, 
“no conventional restrictions can keep metaphysical and 
so-called epistemological inquiries out of the psychology 
books” (James, 1895/1978, p. 88). James came to believe 
that psychology has to be grounded in some metaphysical 
assumptions and that its investigations could, moreover, 
make an important contribution to metaphysics by 
helping to establish the nature of the mind-body 
relationship (Kelly, 2007). (According to Lambeth 
[1999] this shift in James’s approach coincided with 
his rejection of mind/body dualism and his movement 
towards a monistic metaphysics which saw mind and 
body as different aspects of a more fundamental quality.)
 In a similar fashion, I have argued that 
even if psychologists (or scientists in general) do not 
overtly address metaphysical issues, they are always 
in the background, informing one’s perspective and 
approach. Ferrer (2014) has made the same point while 
critiquing the belief of some transpersonal theorists 
that the field should adopt an approach reminiscent of 
scientific naturalism. As Kelly (2007) has stated while 
summarizing James’s position, “The real issue, in short, 
is not whether we will have metaphysics [in psychology], 
but whether we will have good metaphysics, or bad” (p. 
632). In my view, bad metaphysics is when metaphysical 
claims are abstract and speculative and ungrounded 
in empirical research. Good metaphysics is when 
metaphysical claims are inferred or implied by empirical 
evidence, and are carefully developed and cautiously 
stated. It might be said that bad metaphysics is also 
when a metaphysical framework is unacknowledged or 
hidden, as opposed to when it is overtly and explicitly 
stated. 
 Hartelius (2015) has acknowledged that science 
inevitably includes some metaphysical assumptions. 
He has also acknowledged that his statement that 
“consciousness in some form penetrates through all 
physicality” (p. 26) is “just as unavoidably metaphysical 
as the countervailing notion of naïve materialism” 
(Hartelius, 2017c, p. 142).1 But where do these 
assumptions end? Where is the cut-off point that 
separates a “scientific” field with just a few metaphysical 
assumptions from a religious or “New Age” field with a 
lot of metaphysical assumptions? I agree that this may 
not be an “all or nothing” position—at least in the 
sense that one should try to exclude “bad” metaphysics. 
It might be possible to exclude speculative discussions 
about chakras, auras, and astral bodies—or abstract 
conceptual systems—from transpersonal psychology. 
Nevertheless, some form of metaphysical paradigm will 
always be in the background, informing one’s attitude 
and approach with assumptions (often unconscious and 
unacknowledged) about the nature of reality.
 In response to my account of early quantum 
physicists who had a positive attitude to metaphysics, 
Hartelius (2017c) has insisted that these physicists kept 
their metaphysical musings out of their science. As he 
has written, “While quantum physicists have engaged 
in conversations that involve metaphysical speculation, 
it is evident that they have also held a clear demarcation 
between philosophy and science” (p. 137). However, if 
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one looks at some of the actual writings of such quantum 
physicists, this assertion seems doubtful. In many of 
their books, these physicists freely mingled science 
and metaphysics, describing some of their findings 
and discussing what they implied about the nature of 
reality, or of human consciousness, without making 
any demarcation. For example, in books such as Physics 
and Philosophy (1942/2009) and The Mysterious Universe 
(1937), the British physicist James Jeans explicitly and 
thoroughly examined the metaphysical implications of 
modern physics. He stated that he was examining “that 
borderland territory between physics and philosophy” 
which “suddenly became so interesting and important 
through recent developments of theoretical physics …
[with] questions which touch human life very closely, 
such as materialism and free-will” (Jeans, 1942/2009, 
p. 1). In The Mysterious Universe (1937) Jeans made the 
well-known statement that, “The universe begins to 
look more like a great thought than a great machine. 
Mind no longer appears as an accidental intruder into 
the realm of matter” (p. 137). Max Planck (1931) took a 
similar approach in The Universe in the Light of Modern 
Physics, describing how modern physics implied “realities 
existing apart from our sense-perceptions, and that 
there are problems and conflicts where these realities are 
of greater value for us than the richest treasures of the 
world of experience” (p. 107). Werner Heisenberg (1958) 
took a similar approach in The Physicists’ Conception of 
Nature, as did Erwin Schroedinger, Albert Einstein, 
and Wolfgang Pauli in various books. The idea that 
these physicists ceased to be scientists because they 
addressed metaphysical issues—as Hartelius (2017c) 
has suggested should be the case with me, since I have 
a published a book with the subtitle The Psychology of 
Spiritual Awakening (Taylor, 2017c) which incorporates 
perennialist metaphysical claims—seems bizarre. 
 This shows how difficult it is separate science 
and metaphysics. As William James concluded, it is 
impossible to try to bracket out metaphysical claims or to 
keep science and metaphysics in different compartments. 
In reality, there is no boundary and they continually 
merge into one another. As suggested in Taylor (2017b), 
many contemporary scientists also routinely make claims 
about the nature of mind or of reality itself, usually 
within a materialist metaphysical framework that sees 
human being as genetic machines, consciousness as a by-
product of brain activity, and human life as essentially 
purposeless and meaningless.
 
The Metaphysics of Materialism
As noted above, William James believed that psychology could make a significant contribution 
to metaphysics, and I believe this is also the case with 
transpersonal psychology at the present time. Succinctly 
put, transpersonal psychology may be able to contribute 
to a cultural movement beyond the metaphysical 
framework of scientific materialism and towards a new 
“post-materialist” metaphysics, as exemplified by the 
contemporary “post-materialist science” movement. 
(Beauregard et al., 2014). To develop my argument, it 
will be necessary to briefly examine the metaphysical 
framework of materialism in more detail and to highlight 
some of its cultural effects. (Incidentally, let me make it 
clear that the following section should not be taken as a 
direct critique of Hartelius’s approach. I am not suggesting 
that he advocates the naive materialist position which will 
be described here.)
 Materialism is a form of monism suggesting that 
matter is the primary reality of the universe, and that 
most significant phenomena can be explained in terms 
of (or as epiphenomena of) the interactions of material 
particles. There were some ancient philosophers who put 
forward materialist views, particularly in ancient Greece 
and Rome. (For example, the poetical tract The Nature 
of Things by the Roman poet Lucretius [2007] described 
the universe as a giant machine and explained mental 
and physical phenomena in terms of tiny elementary 
particles.) Similarly, some scientists began to adopt a 
materialist metaphysics as early as the 17th century 
(Ferrer, 2014), but materialism arguably only started to 
become a prevalent metaphysical paradigm in Western 
culture towards the end of the 19th century. With the 
decline of religion there was a widespread realization 
amongst intellectuals that the findings of science could be 
adapted to provide a new conceptual framework to make 
sense of the world. One fervent Victorian materialist was 
T. H. Huxley (1874), who described human beings as 
“conscious automata” (p. 577) with no free will. Another 
prominent scientist of the time, Henry Maudsley (1879), 
stated that “mind is an outcome and function of matter 
in a certain state of organization” (p. 667). 
 An early expression of the materialist worldview 
in psychology was behaviorism which suggested 
that all human behaviour was simply the result of 
environmental influences, and that mental phenomena 
and consciousness itself could be disregarded, since 
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they could not be observed. Later developments such 
as cognitive psychology and biopsychology were 
also underpinned with materialist assumptions. In 
philosophy, a similar expression was the field of logical 
positivism which held that only things that could be 
observed and verified by the senses were meaningful, 
and that metaphysical statements could be disregarded 
because they could not be verified. The discovery of 
genes offered a way of explaining human development 
and behavior in terms of microcosmic elements and 
led to a new interpretation of evolution (known as 
Neo-Darwinism) which in turn led to the field of 
evolutionary psychology. At the same time, the medical 
advances of the twentieth century were amazingly 
successful, lending support to the notion of the human 
body as essentially a very complex machine that can 
be fixed when it malfunctions. The fields of neurology 
and neuroscience—facilitated by brain-imaging 
technologies—applied to this model to the brain, 
which was also seen as very complex machine whose 
interactions could account for human experience and 
behavior. All of these developments seemed to suggest 
that the materialist-reductionist enterprise of paring 
things down to their essential elements was valid. As a 
result, materialism took hold as a dominant explanatory 
paradigm.
 Modern day scientific materialism includes 
a number of assumptions—for example, that mental 
phenomena and consciousness itself are the product 
of neurological activity; that human beings and other 
living beings are biochemical machines who exist in 
ontological separation to one another, and who consist 
of genes whose purpose is to survive and replicate; that 
the origins and the evolution of life can be explained 
in terms of accidental factors; that consciousness or 
personal identity cannot continue following the death of 
the body and brain; that human behavior and experience 
are determined by genetic and neurological factors; 
that the world and the universe are fundamentally 
mechanistic and inert; that paranormal phenomena 
cannot exist because they contravene the laws of nature, 
and so on (Kelly et al., 2007; Nagel, 2012; Sheldrake, 
2012; Beauregard et al., 2014).
 Rather than being scientific facts, these tenets 
of materialism are more accurately seen as metaphysical 
extrapolations based on some scientific findings. This 
is not science as such, but scientism, which is a quasi-
religion (Platinga, 2011; Sheldrake, 2012; Beauregard 
et al,. 2014). For example, it is a fact that correlations 
exist between consciousness and brain activity, but an 
assumption that brain activity produces consciousness. 
It is a fact that evolution has taken place, but an 
assumption that it can be explained in terms of purely 
accidental factors. It is a fact that atoms and molecules 
exist, but an assumption that life can be explained in 
purely physicalist terms. 
 There have undoubtedly been some positive 
effects of materialism. Perhaps the rejection of the 
idea of an afterlife has led to increased affirmation and 
acceptance of this life. In a similar way, perhaps—as 
Nietzsche (2005) believed—rejecting the concept 
of God has liberated human beings and provided an 
opportunity for self-development. The evolutionary 
biologist Richard Dawkins (1998) has portrayed the 
positive side of materialism in a similar way. Despite 
the apparent bleakness of his mechanistic worldview, he 
has suggested that meaning emerges from simple fact 
of being alive in the world: “After sleeping through a 
hundred million centuries we have finally opened our 
eyes on a sumptuous planet, sparkling with colour, 
bountiful with life” (p. 8).
 Nonetheless, the metaphysical paradigm 
of materialism has arguably had highly detrimental 
effects. Philosophical materialism has arguably led to 
consumerist materialism—a pervading hedonism and 
individualism, stemming from a feeling that if this 
world is all there is, and human beings are just genetic 
machines, they may as well just enjoy themselves as 
much as possible and take as much from the world as 
they can, without worrying about the consequences 
(Kastrup, 2014). In biomedical terms, materialism has 
helped to establish a mechanistic model of the human 
organism in which even psychological conditions 
are treated as physical disorders that can be “fixed” 
through pharmacological interventions, despite limited 
and questionable evidence for the efficacy of widely 
prescribed psychiatric drugs such as serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors (SSRIs; Kelly et al., 2007; Healy, 2015). 
In environmental terms, it could also be argued that 
materialism has encouraged and sanctioned an attitude 
of domineering recklessness to the natural world in 
which natural phenomena (which are after all no more 
than chemical machines) only have a utilitarian value. 
If nature is insentient and exists in otherness to human 
beings, then it becomes little more than a supply of 
resources (Taylor, in press). 
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Post-Materialism
Materialists tend to see themselves as in opposition to traditional religion, with materialism as the 
only viable alternative to a prerational mythic and 
superstitious worldview (Nagel, 2012). However, there 
are certainly other possibilities. A significant recent 
development in science has been the “post-materialist 
science” movement, founded by a group of scientists 
including Mario Beauregard, Lisa Miller, and Gary 
Schwartz (Beauregard et al., 2014). The aim of this 
movement is to highlight the metaphysical assumptions 
that underpin materialist science (as described above), 
and to suggest that these are no longer viable, as they 
cannot explain or account for many aspects of human 
experience and multiple phenomena which appear 
“anomalous” from the standpoint of materialism. 
 The post-materialist science movement has 
its own explicit metaphysical assumptions which are 
deemed to accord more closely with scientific evidence 
and offer a more complete and cohesive explanation 
of reality than the materialist model. One of these 
assumptions is that “Mind represents an aspect of reality 
as primordial as the physical world. Mind is fundamental 
in the universe, i.e., it cannot be derived from matter 
and reduced to anything more basic” (Beauregard et al., 
2014, p. 273). Other key assumptions are that “There is a 
deep interconnectedness between mind and the physical 
world” and that “Minds are apparently unbounded and 
may unite in ways suggesting a unitary One Mind that 
includes all individual single minds” (p. 273). 
 According to the post-materialist science 
movement, in recent decades the metaphysical paradigm 
of materialist science has become increasingly untenable. 
A number of new scientific fields and an increasing 
number of general scientific findings have begun to cast 
doubt on many of its assumptions. As early as the 1990s, 
Dupré (1993) described how materialist reductionism as 
a strategy had met with widespread failure throughout 
the fields of biology, genetics, ecology, and psychology. 
While as Ferrer (2014) has summarized, “Important 
contemporary trends in complexity theory, nonlinear 
science, and neuroscience not only postulate diverse forms 
of downward causation but also challenge the epistemic 
superiority of reductionist explanations” (p. 155). 
 To take one specific example, the mapping of 
the human genome—the so-called Genome Project, the 
first draft of which was completed in 2000—discovered 
that human beings have far fewer genes than expected, 
many of which are shared by other life forms. This makes 
it difficult to explain the physical, neurological, and 
behavioral complexity of human beings—and the full 
range of differences between species—in genetic terms 
(Sheldrake, 2012). The project was originally predicted 
to bring about a revolution in healthcare, showing how 
common diseases were caused by the inheritance of 
faulty genes, but it was found that faulty genes have very 
little role in predisposing human beings to disease (Hall, 
2010; Sheldrake, 2012). The project also cast doubt on 
the simplistic image of genes—put forward by Dawkins 
(1976), for example—as self-contained, discrete pieces 
of DNA with specific roles. The reality was found to 
be much more complex than this, showing that most 
genes cooperate and multitask. Single genes can code for 
several different proteins and may have other roles too. 
As a result, the genome project spelled the end of the 
popular belief that there are “genes for” certain traits and 
characteristics (Hall, 2010; Sheldrake, 2012).
 In a more general way, the confidence of 
neurological materialists has been dented by the lack 
of any progress in attempts to explain consciousness in 
neurological terms, as it looks increasingly unlikely that 
there is any direct causal link between brain activity 
and consciousness. As a result, panpsychist explanations 
of consciousness have begun to seem more viable. As 
the neuroscientist Cristof Koch (2014)—originally a 
materialist who worked with Francis Crick for many years 
to try to establish the neural correlates of consciousness—
has written: 
Emergence of subjective feelings from physical stuff 
appears inconceivable … . The phenomenal hails from 
a kingdom other than the physical and is subject to 
different laws. I see no way for the divide between 
unconscious and conscious states to be bridged by 
bigger brains or more complex neurons. (p. 28) 
As a result, Koch has adopted the panpsychist 
view that consciousness is an inherent feature of the 
universe. A diverse range of other findings from areas 
such as neuroplasticity, placebo studies, psi experiments, 
studies of near-death experiences, and modern physics 
have added weight to the view that, rather than being 
simply produced by brain activity, mind is nonmaterial 
and fundamental to the universe (Kelly et al., 2007; 
Kelly, Crabtree, & Marshall, 2015; Taylor, in press). 
As Kelly (2007) has summarized, “The body conceived 
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conventionally as a physiological machine has proven 
unable to count for all the properties of minds, and so 
we must find a different theory that can better account 
for the empirical data” (p. 630). 
 As a final example, the relatively new field of 
quantum biology has shown that strange quantum 
effects do not just occur inside atoms; they permeate the 
macrocosmic world. Phenomena such as photosynthesis, 
the navigation of some birds via the Earth’s magnetic 
field, and the movement of protons inside molecules, 
appear to involve quantum process such as entanglement, 
non-locality, and “quantum tunneling” (Ball, 2011; Al-
Khalili & McFadden, 2014). This implies that it is no 
longer possible to separate the quantum world from the 
macrocosmic everyday world, pretending that it has 
no significance. Materialists can no longer simply base 
their worldview on the principles of Newtonian physics, 
while ignoring the implications of quantum physics. As 
is clear from the discussion of early quantum physicists 
above, these findings strongly imply post-materialist 
metaphysical perspectives—and at the very least, strongly 
undermine the assumptions of materialism (Kelly at al., 
2007; Taylor, in press).  
 Arguably, unlike most other psychological 
approaches, transpersonal psychology is traditionally 
allied to post-materialist science. Due to its traditional 
allegiance to Eastern spiritual traditions (which of course 
offer alternative metaphysical perspectives), and its 
investigations into the farther reaches of human nature 
and anomalous phenomena, transpersonal psychology 
has traditionally included (and sanctioned) post-
materialist metaphysical perspectives. In fact, for better 
or worse, the field has traditionally attracted individuals 
who are disenchanted with the materialist metaphysical 
paradigm and are keen to investigate alternative models 
of reality. Certainly, in my own experience of teaching 
transpersonal psychology courses at my university and 
attending transpersonal psychology conferences, this has 
appeared to be the primary appeal of the field.
 Rather than attempting to adopt the 
metaphysical paradigm of naturalistic science—as Ferrer 
(2014) has suggested of transpersonal psychologists 
such as Friedman and MacDonald—and rather than 
attempting to be metaphysically neutral or to bracket 
out metaphysics, it would surely be more advisable for 
transpersonal psychology to accept its natural allegiance 
to post-materialistic science, to adopt its metaphysical 
perspective, and to allow it to inform its approach. It 
could be argued that, in recent years, there has been a 
tendency for some transpersonal psychologists to look in 
the wrong direction—towards materialism, rather than 
post-materialism. 
 It is important to point out that this does not just 
mean adhering to one particular metaphysical position. 
There are many forms of post-materialist metaphysics, 
including panpsychism (which itself includes many 
different varieties, such as panexperientialism and 
panprotopsychism), idealism, panentheism, dual-aspect 
monism, and non-Cartesian dualist-interactionist models. 
So, adopting a general post-materialist metaphysical 
outlook does not necessarily entail ceasing to be pluralistic. 
Nevertheless, these approaches share commonalities—
most fundamentally, their rejection of the materialist 
view that matter is the primary reality of the universe 
and that mental phenomena are reducible to materialist 
causes. In contrast, these approaches infer that mind 
(or consciousness) is at least as fundamental as matter, 
and is possibly even (according to some approaches) a 
fundamental universal quality that precedes matter. As 
well as positing a different relationship between mind 
and brain, these approaches allow for a more complex 
understanding of phenomena such as evolution, death 
(including the possibility of an afterlife), spiritual 
experiences, and psychic phenomena (Kelly et al., 2007; 
Nagel, 2012, Kelly et al., 2015; Taylor, in press). 
 Since perennialism has been a major topic of 
this debate, it is important to consider its relationship 
with post-materialist perspectives. Soft perennialism 
(or essentialism) can be seen as a post-materialist 
interpretation of spiritual experiences and traditions, 
as opposed (for example) to a materialist interpretation 
which sees spiritual experiences as simple products 
of neurological activity. Soft perennialism is an 
interpretation which is inferred from—and supported 
by—post-materialistic perspectives that view mind 
or consciousness as a fundamental and/or universal 
quality. Arguably, panpsychism does not support the 
soft perennialist model, since it does not posit a universal 
non-material quality or essence, but only that all matter 
has a mental aspect to it, and therefore a certain degree of 
sentience. However, post-materialist perspectives such as 
idealism and dual-aspect monism do allow for the claims 
of soft perennialism, since they do posit a fundamental or 
universal non-material quality.
 Soft perennialism posits an immanent and all-
pervading spiritual force or essence which is conceptualized 
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in different ways by different spiritual traditions. In 
contemplative or mystical traditions associated with 
monotheistic religions, it is conceptualized in theistic 
terms, while in other traditions it is conceptualized in 
terms of fundamental spiritual principles such as brahman, 
tao, or dharmakaya. It is also conceived in various (but 
similar) ways by many indigenous cultures. This spiritual 
force is the essence of everything that exists, so that there 
is a fundamental interconnectedness between all things. 
It is also the essence of one’s own being—as is sometimes 
directly sensed in experiences of “pure consciousness” —
so that human beings are fundamentally interconnected 
with (and even actually one with) all things, including all 
other human beings (Taylor, 2016). These claims accord 
very well with the post-materialist scientific claims that 
“mind is fundamental in the universe,” that “there is a 
deep interconnectedness between mind and the physical 
world,” and that “minds are apparently unbounded and 
may unite in ways suggesting a unitary, One Mind that 
includes all individual, single minds” (Beauregard et al., 
2014, p. 273). 
 It is also worth remembering that it is impossible 
to avoid metaphysics. Transpersonal psychology cannot 
help but be grounded in, or allied with, some form of 
metaphysical paradigm—and it is surely preferable 
for the field to ally itself to post-materialist scientific 
perspectives rather than to some form of materialism.
The Contribution of Transpersonal Psychology
Hartelius (2017c) has argued that rather than separating itself as an “elite spiritual community” 
transpersonal psychology should “engage with and 
influence the field of psychology” (p. 143).  He has also 
suggested a number of ways in which transpersonal 
psychology can influence the mainstream. I agree with 
this approach and his assertion that transpersonal 
psychology is “one of the very few orientations currently 
capable of mounting the sort of challenge urgently needed 
as a corrective for contemporary psychology” (p. 144). 
But unlike Hartelius, I believe that, most fundamentally, 
transpersonal psychology should challenge and influence 
mainstream psychology by committing itself to a post-
materialist metaphysical approach and encouraging 
mainstream psychology to move beyond its present materialist 
metaphysics, towards post-materialist perspectives. 
 This is a valuable contribution that transpersonal 
psychology can make—not just to the field of psychology, 
but to the whole of science and by extension, to the whole 
of Western culture. (Of course, there is no reason why 
transpersonal psychology should necessarily have any 
cultural role or any social responsibility, but this is an 
approach it could take.) One could make a comparison 
to studies of near-death experiences or of paranormal 
phenomena. These areas are fiercely debated precisely 
because they threaten the basic assumptions of the 
materialist metaphysical model. Thus, adherents to 
materialism often go to great lengths to try to explain 
away the apparent positive findings of psi experiments 
or to explain near-death experiences in neurological or 
physiological terms (Kelly et al., 2007; Carter, 2010; 
Sartori, 2014; Taylor, in press). This is because these 
phenomena are, one might say, potential metaphysical 
“game-changers.” That is, if they were proven to be real, 
they would undermine the materialist metaphysical 
model. For example, if near-death experiences cannot 
be explained in neurological or physiological terms, 
then they strongly imply that consciousness can occur 
independently of the brain, and so is not directly 
produced by brain activity. If telepathy is real, there is an 
implication that one’s own thoughts do not simply exist 
within one’s own private mental space, as a product of 
neurological activity, but that mind is somehow shared 
collectively, as something more fundamental than the 
brain, or matter in general. (On the other hand, if it 
could be categorically shown that these phenomena 
can be wholly explained in materialistic terms, then 
this would confirm the materialist model.) As a result, 
research in these areas is immensely valuable. 
 One can make a similar claim for research in 
transpersonal psychology. In my view, the investigation 
of higher states of consciousness or spiritual (or 
awakening) experiences, of the effects of psycho-
spiritual transformative practices or substances (such 
as meditation, mindfulness, or psychedelics) and 
ongoing states of personal or spiritual transformation, 
is as significant as the investigation of NDEs or psi 
experiences. Similarly to their approach to NDEs and 
psychic phenomena, adherents to materialism tend to 
explain spiritual experiences in terms of abnormal or 
aberrational neurological activity. As Mahner (2012) 
has stated, modern science has excluded “supernatural” 
phenomena as a metaphysical supposition. Like 
NDEs, spiritual experiences are often interpreted as 
hallucinations or delusions (Aaen-Stockdale, 2012). 
 Another  characteristic of materialism is a 
naïve faith in the objectivity and reliability of ordinary 
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awareness. There is an assumption that, in an ordinary 
state of awareness, the world is seen in a reliable and 
objective way, and that nonordinary (or altered) states 
of awareness can only be inauthentic, and the worldview 
they present can only be illusory. In other words, there is 
an assumption of the hegemony of ordinary awareness—
the assumption that ordinary awareness is superior to 
any other form of awareness.
 In a similar way to studies of NDEs and psychic 
phenomena, therefore, transpersonal psychology could 
challenge the hegemony of ordinary awareness and 
play an essential role in establishing the authenticity of 
expansive states of being. It could suggest the existence 
of wider realms of experience than those conceived 
of by materialism, pointing to what Ferrer (2014) 
has described as “the plausibility of a deep and ample 
multidimensional cosmos in which the sensible world 
(as narrowly conceived by modern naturalism) does not 
exhaust the possibilities of the Real” (p. 170).2 
 Even more importantly, by analyzing the 
transformative effects of psychospiritual practices—and 
instances of spontaneous transformation—transpersonal 
psychology may help to make expansive states of being 
more culturally acceptable and more accessible. In 
this way, transpersonal psychology can contribute to a 
shift towards post-materialist perspectives. Most NDE 
researchers, parapsychologists, and psi researchers do not 
refrain from stating the metaphysical implications of their 
research (for example, Van Lommel, 2006; Sartori, 2014; 
Radin, 2009; Sheldrake, 2012), and there is no reason 
why transpersonal psychologists should do so either. For 
transpersonal psychology, this would also mean embracing 
such fields as parapsychology and near-death studies as 
natural bedfellows, rather than excluding them on the 
grounds that a scientific field should have no dealings 
with supernatural or transcendent experiences (Friedman, 
2013).
 In fact, it could be argued that transpersonal 
psychology has traditionally taken this approach, 
and this is what has traditionally differentiated it 
from more mainstream psychological approaches. 
Within psychology, and Western culture as a whole, 
transpersonal psychology has traditionally offered 
and explored post-materialist perspectives, including 
essentialism or perennialism (Ferrer, 2002). There is 
therefore a danger that, if transpersonal psychology 
attempts to bracket out metaphysics, or even allies itself 
to the materialist metaphysical paradigm (Ferrer, 2014), 
then it would lose this essential role. It would cease to be 
distinguishable from other psychological approaches—
such as positive psychology or anomalistic psychology—
and possibly be subsumed by them, and therefore cease 
to exist. Also, significantly for the longstanding viability 
of the field, this may mean losing its traditional appeal 
to students and practitioners. (In a more general sense, 
this is a potential issue with the recommendation by 
transpersonal theorists, such as Friedman [2013] and 
MacDonald [2013], that transpersonal psychology 
should be a naturalistic science, excluding metaphysical 
and supernatural concerns, together with supposedly 
nonscientific approaches such as hermeneutics or 
contemplative methodologies. At a certain point, there 
is a sense that the “trans” is being removed from the 
“transpersonal.”) Rather than attempting to change 
itself so that it can become integrated into mainstream 
psychology, transpersonal psychology should rather 
continue its efforts to change mainstream psychology. 
Rather than reducing itself to try to fit into the 
mainstream, transpersonal psychology should try to 
broaden the mainstream.
Common Ground
At this point, there is some common ground with Hartelius. Like him, I believe that the best way that 
transpersonal psychology can influence mainstream 
psychology and contribute to cultural change is by 
taking a more empirical, research-based approach and 
by becoming less oriented around Eastern wisdom 
traditions. Hartelius (2017c) has mentioned that in recent 
years among his students there has been “a shift toward 
greater interest in empirical data and research” (p. 143). 
This is a very positive development, and I am pleased to 
say that in the UK we have made similar progress in our 
transpersonal psychology-based degree courses, both at 
my university (Leeds Beckett University) and elsewhere. 
More and more students are choosing transpersonal 
topics for their dissertations and pursuing these with 
scientific rigor. 
 Transpersonal psychology has traditionally been 
too speculative, conceptual, and theoretical. It is not 
enough to simply formulate theories or models and try 
to justify them in terms of previous research, in terms of 
the internal coherence and seeming validity of the theory 
itself, or in relation to other theories. It is important to 
test concepts and theories, and not to just leave them 
hanging in abstract space. This was a weakness of 
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Wilber’s model—rather than being firmly grounded in 
research, it was largely an abstract metaphysical system, 
and therefore an example of “bad metaphysics,” in terms 
of Kelly’s (2007) distinction. As a result, I have been keen 
to encourage and contribute to research projects, and to 
refine and improve my approach to research on an ongoing 
basis. I believe that transpersonal psychology can benefit 
from a whole range of different approaches to research, 
from contemplative methodologies to quantitative and 
psychometric approaches. 
 At the same time, whilst the wisdom traditions 
are a great source of insight and guidance, it is essential 
for transpersonal psychology to study experiences that 
occur outside their contexts. As suggested in Taylor 
(2016), awakening experiences (or ongoing states of 
wakefulness) may be interpreted within the context of 
particular spiritual traditions, but they frequently occur 
to individuals who have no background in or knowledge 
of the traditions. According to the soft perennialist 
model, spiritual and mystical experiences are glimpses of 
expansive potential ranges of human experience that are 
more fundamental than any particular tradition.
 However, the main point of divergence with 
Hartelius is that I do not believe that in order to 
proceed in a more empirical, research-based direction 
transpersonal psychology necessarily has to abandon a 
perennial perspective, or eschew or attempt to bracket 
out metaphysics. (Indeed, as suggested above, this would 
possibly have a seriously deleterious effect.) Hartelius 
(2017c) has claimed that “soft perennialism is based on 
no valid evidence whatsoever” (p. 139, italics in original). 
However, I would suggest that, as with his definitions of 
science and metaphysics, Hartelius’s definition of evidence 
is too narrow and is derived from the metaphysical 
suppositions of scientific materialism. 
 The evidence for soft perennialism—or 
essentialism—presented in Taylor (2017a) includes the 
various studies using Hood’s scale (suggesting a common 
core of characteristics of mystical experiences across 
and outside spiritual traditions); the examinations of 
cross-traditional spiritual texts and reports of mystical 
experiences made by Studstill (2005), Rose (2016), and 
others; many cases of individuals who have experienced 
expansive states of being outside the context (and 
without knowledge) of spiritual traditions; a number 
of similar themes in the process of spiritual awakening 
across various traditions (as presented in Taylor, 2016); 
accounts of the aftereffects of near-death experiences 
and of the characteristics of post-traumatic growth; the 
inadequacy of attempts to explain these commonalities 
through neuroscientific reductionism, contextualism, or 
radical diffusion, and so on. My own research has also 
highlighted that both temporary awakening experiences 
and ongoing states of what I have called wakefulness 
often arise spontaneously outside spiritual traditions, 
allowing for the possibility that there are realms of more 
expansive potential human experience that precede and 
inform spiritual traditions (see Taylor & Egeto-Szabo, 
2017, for the most recent examples).
 Ferrer (2002) has performed a worthwhile 
service to the field of transpersonal psychology by 
enacting the “participatory turn.” As he has noted, until 
the end of the 1990s, transpersonal psychology was 
strongly affiliated with perennialism (more specifically, 
with a “hard” perennialist approach). Hartelius (2017b) 
has written that perennialism was “introduced into 
psychology by Wilber” (p. 121), but as Ferrer (2002) 
has pointed out, Maslow (1970) had already suggested 
perennial perspectives before then, and numerous 
other transpersonal theorists besides Wilber adopted 
perennialist perspectives (for example, Vaughan, 1982; 
Grof, 1988; Harman, 1988; Wittine, 1989). As Ferrer 
(2002) has written, “the philosophical foundations of 
transpersonal theory have generally been associated with 
perennial philosophy … and the spiritual universalism 
typical of perennialism pervades both early and modem 
transpersonal scholarship” (pp. 71-72). Indeed, as Ferrer 
(2002) has noted, transpersonal psychology was often 
defined in terms of perennialism or seen as an attempt to 
apply or justify the principles of perennialism.
 This movement away from this strong 
association with perennialism has undoubtedly had 
a liberating and invigorating effect, partly due to 
the weakening influence of Wilber’s overly abstract 
metaphysical model. However, it could be argued that 
the pendulum has swung too far away in the other 
direction, and that some transpersonal psychologists 
have been too extreme in their mistrust of metaphysics 
and any forms of essentialism (together with their 
reluctance to consider so-called supernatural and 
transcendent experiences) and in their desire to adopt 
avowedly scientific approaches. Ideally, in my view, this 
extreme swing will correct itself, and transpersonal 
psychology will find a new balance which incorporates 
more nuanced and subtle forms of perennialism (in 
other words, “softer” forms of perennialism, equivalent 
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to phenomenological perennialism or essentialism) and 
allows for cautious and carefully justified metaphysical 
claims.
Cultural Differences 
One should also be aware of cultural-geographical differences that inform attitudes to transpersonal 
psychology. The drive to “scientize” transpersonal 
psychology may have special significance to transpersonal 
theorists based in the United States, because of the 
particular status of transpersonal psychology there. 
Transpersonal psychology is certainly not an influential 
field in the UK, but it is not marginalized in the way 
that it is in the United States. The British Psychological 
Society (BPS) includes a Transpersonal Section, and 
many transpersonal psychologists (including myself ) 
are members of the BPS and entitled to refer to 
themselves as psychologists. Generally speaking, the 
climate in psychology in the UK appears to be a little 
“softer” than that in the United States, and more open 
to perspectives and approaches that some psychologists 
might see as nonscientific. For example, the journal 
of the British Psychological Society (The Psychologist) 
has recently had themed issues devoted to qualitative 
research methods and research into psychedelics and has 
published articles on transpersonal-related themes such 
as ecstatic experiences, neurological interpretations of 
mystical experiences, and mindfulness. In the United 
States, transpersonal psychology appears to have a lower 
standing, and to be largely seen as pseudoscientific. It 
is therefore perhaps understandable that theorists such 
as Hartelius and Friedman have been working hard to 
advance its scientific credentials, by trying to free it 
from what skeptics call “woo,” and turning away from 
areas that are controversial from the perspective of 
materialist science (such as psi phenomena and mystical 
experiences). 
 In itself, this is a laudable enterprise. The 
invocation to make the field more research-based 
and to incorporate more quantitative (as well as 
qualitative) research is very welcome. However, as 
suggested above, the “scientizing” approach has 
arguably gone too far and runs the risk of separating 
transpersonal psychology from its traditional and 
natural alliance with post-materialist perspectives, 
and alienating the field form its potential adherents. 
Rather than adopting mainstream psychological 
approaches and distancing itself from other post-
materialist fields (such as near-death studies and 
parapsychology), it should cooperate with the latter 
in an effort to highlight the deficiencies of materialist 
metaphysics and the viability of post-materialist 
approaches. It is possible to envision a healthy form 
of transpersonal psychology that takes a rigorously 
scientific approach at  the same time as adopting 
post-materialistic metaphysical perspectives, thereby 
making a significant contribution to cultural change. 
 A transpersonal psychologist I met at a 
conference recently told me that, despite repeated 
attempts to persuade her, she has never engaged in 
a written dialogue in an academic journal. She felt 
that the dialogue process can easily become a kind 
of alpha male dueling in which researchers hold fast 
to their own positions, take swipes at each other, and 
bat away each other’s criticisms, bouncing back and 
forth without reaching any resolution. This dialogue 
has certainly included those elements to some degree, 
but at the same time I feel that it has been productive, 
particularly in stimulating me to further deliberation 
and consideration of my own theories and approaches 
to research. I wish to thank Glenn Hartelius for the 
opportunity to debate these important issues and hope 
that we have stimulated other theorists to address 
them. 
Notes
1.  In my view, throughout this dialogue, Hartelius 
has underestimated the influence of metaphysical 
assumptions, both within transpersonal approaches 
and science in general. For example, in Hartelius 
(2017b) a number of supposed non-metaphysical 
and non-authoritarian approaches to transpersonal 
psychology are recommended, including Friedman’s 
scientific approach and Ferrer’s participatory 
approaches. However, it is debatable whether either 
Friedman’s or Ferrer’s approaches are actually 
metaphysics-free. As Ferrer (2014) has argued, 
Friedman’s approach to transpersonal psychology 
“effectively binds transpersonal psychology to a 
naturalistic metaphysical worldview that is hostile 
to most spiritual knowledge claims” (p. 152). At 
the same time, I have argued above that Ferrer’s 
own approach includes metaphysical assumptions, 
and that his insistence on the undetermined nature 
of the “mystery” could be construed as a reluctance 
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to be open about his metaphysical position (Taylor, 
2017a).
2.   In Ferrer (2014) a similar approach to mine in this 
paper is suggested, with the view that rather than 
binding itself to scientific naturalism, transpersonal 
psychology should adopt an “open naturalism” that 
is free from materialism and reductionism and 
“open to both the ontological integrity of spiritual 
referents and the plausibility of subtle dimensions 
of reality” (p. 174). 
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